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AMENDED ARTICLE 1 OF DRAFT PROTOCOL I TO
THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: THE COMING
OF AGE OF THE GUERRILLA*
JAMES E. BOND**
Writing in this issue of the Washington and Lee Law Review,1
Captain David Graham savages amended Article 12 of draft Protocol
I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.3 Specifically, he attacks the Article
on the following grounds: (1) it is politically motivated by third-
worlders determined to remake international law according to their
own preferences; (2) it is poorly drafted and therefore cannot be im-
plemented effectively; and (3) it would legitimize wars of national
* This paper was originally prepared for presentation to the International Studies
Association panel on "International Law and the Regulation of Armed Conflict" at its
annual meeting, February 19-21, 1975.
** Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. A.B. (1964),
Wabash College; J.D. (1967), Harvard University; L.L.M. (1971), S.J.D. (1972),
University of Virginia.
I Graham, The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on the Law of War: a Victory for
Political Causes and a Return to the Just War Concept of Eleventh Century, 32 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 25 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Graham].
2 The text of amended Article 1, approved by a vote of 70 to 21, with 13 absten-
tions, states:
1. The present Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Con-
ventions of August 12, 1949, for the Protection of War Victims, shall
apply in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to these Con-
ventions.
2. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include
armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial and
alien occupation and racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and
the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations.
3. The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to
ensure respect for the present protocol in all circumstances.
4. In cases not included in the present Protocol or in other in-
struments of treaty law, civilians and combatants remain under the
protection and authority of the principles of international law derived
from established custom, from the principle of humanity and from the
dictates of public conscience.
3 Draft Protocol I is a product of several years work by the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross, working with the United Nations Secretariat and "governmental
experts" from many countries. It is designed to modernize and update the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949, which generally apply to international armed conflict. The text
of the protocol may be obtained from The International Committee of the Red Cross.
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liberation and lead to discriminatory treatment of combatants. These
are serious charges, raised by a serious scholar, whose closeness to the
subject and to several members of the United States delegation to
the Geneva Conference strongly suggest that his views reflect those
of his government;5 and they merit an equally serious answer.
I shall detail my answer in the following pages. Briefly summa-
rized, it is this. The political motivation behind Article 1 is irrelevant
in assessing its wisdom. Its drafting defects, while egregious, are not
irremediable. Moreover, fears that Article 1 will compromise the
effectiveness of the law of war are exaggerated: adoption of the
amended Article will neither legitimize wars of national liberation
nor lead to discriminatory treatment of combatants. Article 1, for all
its weaknesses, represents a positive development in the- evolution of
the law of war from a body of law applicable only to international
armed conflict to a cohesive legal regime regulating serious armed
conflict of all kinds.'
Political Motivation
Article I quite naturally reflects the political preferences of the
third-worlders who constitute the "new majority" in international
At the time Captain Graham wrote the article, he was assigned to the Judge
Advocate General's School as a professor in international law with responsibilities for
teaching the law of war to military lawyers. Both the Judge Advocate General and the
Chief of the International Law Section of the Office of the Judge Advocate General
were members of the United States delegation.
' Many of the points that Captain Graham makes closely parallel those made by
Professor Richard Baxter, our most knowledgeable student of the law of war and
likewise a member of the United States delegation, in the conference report which he
prepared for submission to the Secretary of State by the delegation chief, George
Aldrich. See, e.g., Baxter, Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Politics? The 1974
Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law, 16 HAzv. INT'L LAW J. 1 (1975); For-
sythe, The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law: Some Observations, 69
AM. J. OF INT'L LAW 77 (1975).
Colonel G. I. A. D. Draper has observed:
The awareness among the percipient that respect for human rights
cannot be fragmented into time of peace and of war and that such
rights are under maximum threat in time of war, together with con-
temporary political and technological developments, led to the follow-
ing position: The regime of human rights will come in time to be the
normal ordering in civil society; if war breaks out, inter- or intra-
State, that regime does not dissipate. First, it is there waiting in the
background the whole time to take over once the conflict abates. Sec-
ond, a lower level of that regime then comes into play by way of
derogation made strictly necessary by the emergency situation. That
lower regime is the Law of Armed Conflicts.
Draper, The Ethical and Judicial Status of Constraints in War, 55 MIL. L. REv. 169,
181 (1972).
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affairs. What else would one expect now that these peoples have come
of age and have assumed voting control of those international institu-
tions that make international law? The rules of any legal system
inevitably reflect the political preferences of the predominant
group(s) in that community,7 and the international legal system is no
exception.
Does anyone doubt that the customary international law which
evolved during the 19th century reflected the political preferences of
the European nations and the United States? Only a country with far
flung commercial interests would need a rule that permitted it to
intervene in a foreign country in order to rescue the local representa-
tive of Standard Oil from the native cooking pot. The doctrine of
humanitarian intervention served the political interests of the pre-
dominant powers and survived so long as those countries dominated
the international community.8 Does anyone doubt that the Ameri-
cans counseled deference to the decisions of the United Nations so
long, and only so long, as they could manage it as the New York
subdivision of the United States State Department?' The lawfulness
of United Nations decisions does not depend, however, on the degree
to which they coincide with American political interest. Whatever the
law-creating function of the United Nations, it survives fluctuations
in the political majorities within it."0 And today, its decisions reflect
the predominant influence of the third-worlders.
Chagrin, disbelief, and anger that these third-worlders should
force upon the Americans and their European allies a rule inconsist-
7 See, e.g., Gussfield, On Legislating Morals: the Symbolic process of Designating
Deviancy, 56 CALW. L. REv. 54, 59 (1968):
My analysis of the American temperance movement has shown how
the issue of drinking and abstinence became a politically significant
focus for the conflicts between Protestant and Catholic, rural and
urban, native and immigrant, middle class and lower class in Ameri-
can society as an abstinent Protestant middle class attempted to con-
trol the public affirmation of morality in drinking. Victory or defeat
thus symbolized the status and power of the opposing cultures ....
'I. BRqWNLIE, PRINcIPLzS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 348 (2d ed. 1973). The
doctrine may have survived in modified form, however. See, e.g., HUMANrrAIAN INTER-
VErnON AND THE: UNrrED NATIONS (R. Lillich. ed. 1973).
1 How else does one explain the almost daily news items reporting disenchantment
by one promiment American or another over the decisions of the last session of the
General Assembly?
," The law-creating function of the constituent organs of the United Nations has
generated a wide-ranging and continuing debate among scholars. See generally R.
HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw THROUGH THE PoLIcAL ORGANS OF
TIE UNITED NATIONS (1963).
1975]
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ent with Western political preferences permeates Captain Graham's
article. At one point he even implies that rules which reflect "their"
preferences rather than "ours" are not law:"
[A] majority of those states advocating the adoption of
amended Article 1 are not concerned with its legal ramifica-
tions or the impact these will have on the United Nations
Charter and other codified concepts of the Law of War. Many
quite candidly state that if adoption of Article 1 causes legal
problems, they will belong to the developed, industrialized
nations and not to those advocating adoption of the article.
Stimulated by the prospect of achieving what they consider to
be a stunning political victory, these third world countries'
pervasive attitude appears to be "The law be damned-we
won."
Perhaps the third-worlders are only saying: "Your law be damned.
This is now the law-take it or leave it." The United States and its
European allies, though they still exert influence far beyond their
numbers in the international community, no longer dominate and
therefore cannot dictate the nature of its rules. The rules adopted by
treaty or that evolve by custom are nevertheless valid.
The fact that a rule is lawful does not mean that all must abide
by it. Fortunately for minorities in the international legal system,
most rules bind only those who expressly assent to them."2 Increas-
ingly then, the United States may have to exercise its "leave it"
option: it must ask itself whether non-adherence or non-participation
will serve its political and diplomatic interests better than would
adherence or participation.' 3 Captain Graham advises that "it would
be both unwise and unnecessary" to accede to Article 1 in its present
" Graham, supra note 1, at 61.
12 Lauterpacht specifically cites the Geneva Conventions as an example of such
non-binding rules.
[A state admitted into the community of nations has] the duty to
submit to all rules in force, with the sole exception of those which, like
the rules of the Geneva Conventions, are binding upon such States
only as have concluded, or later on acceded to, a certain international
treaty creating the rules concerned.
I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (9th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
,3 The on-going deliberations on the law of the sea constitute another situation in
which the United States may face the difficult choice of agreeing to a distasteful legal
regime or going it alone. Professor Claude foresaw this dilemma several years ago in
his perceptive article, The United Nations, the United States, and the Maintenance
of Peace, 23 INT'L ORG. 621 (1969).
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form or, indeed, in any modified form." His advice is doubtless sound
if the Article is as bad as he says it is. But is it?
The fact that the third-worlders have all the votes does not mean
that they have all the brains, of course. They may make bad law.
Majorities often do. On the other hand, they may make good law. The
point, again, is simple enough. All law-bad or good-is politically
motivated. We must then evaluate the wisdom or unwisdom of Arti-
cle 1 by criteria other than the degree to which it was politically
motivated.
Drafting and Implementation
Craftsmanship is one such useful criterion. A treaty provision
should speak clearly and fit neatly into the larger body of law of which
it is a part. 5 If a treaty provision fails in either respect, it creates
confusion rather than certainty in the legal system. Unfortunately,
Article 1, as presently phrased, fails in both respects.
Through paragraph two of the Article the draftsmen would make
all the Geneva conventions applicable to "armed conflicts in which
peoples are fighting against colonial and alien occupation and racist
regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination." Since
"colonialist" and "racist" passed into the epithetical language of
international diplomacy, they have lost whatever objective meaning
they may once have had. The precise nature of a right to self-
determination is uncertain, even when construed, as Article 1 dic-
tates, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Decla-
" Graham, supra note 1, at 61.
" In respect of these elemental characteristics, a treaty does not differ from a well-
drafted statute or contract. Cf. McNAiR, THE LAW OF TREATms 6 (1961). Not surpris-
ingly, the need for a "form book" for treaties has been recognized. See, e.g., THE
TREATY MAKER's HANDBOOK (H. Blix & Emerson, eds. 1973).
See note 2 supra.
' As Professor Emerson observes at the outset of his critical analysis of the doc-
trine:
Any examination of self-determination runs promptly into the
difficulty that while the concept lends itself to simple formulation in
words which have a ring of universal applicability and perhaps of
revolutionary slogans, when the time comes to put it into operation
it turns out to be a complex matter hedged in by limitations and
caveats. . . .The most obvious questions which must be asked about
self-determination are usually familiar and straightforward but they
all tend to suffer from the same common defect of lacking unambi-
guous answers which can be easily adapted to meet the pressures of
political demands and counterdemands.
Emerson, Self-Determination, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 459 (1971).
19751
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ration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Cooperation among States. The Charter is, after all, a
constitutional document filled with high level abstractions; indeed,
it refers but once to the principle of self-determination without elabo-
ration. The Declaration on Principles speaks in very general terms as
well, and its status as law is doubtful. 8
The ambiguity of these Article 1 definitions may be illustrated
easily. To which of the many armed conflicts presently raging
throughout the world would it apply? The guerilla wars in Mozam-
bique and Angola probably represent the clearest cases of applica-
tion. Unfortunately, they neither typify the kinds of internal conflicts
that presently flourish throughout the world nor the kinds of internal
conflicts that will flourish in the coming decades. 9 Colonialism is a
dying, if not already dead, phenomenon. Yet its demise will not dim-
inish the incidence of internal conflict; and a definition of armed
conflict that does not embrace the range of those that one may rea-
sonably anticipate will arise is troublesome.
Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Ethiopia, Yemen, the Middle East and
Vietnam typify present and future conflicts. Can one characterize
any one of the parties to these disputes as struggling against a coloni-
alist/alien dominated/racist regime? Which one? Can one identify
whose right of self-determination is at stake? The Article 1 standards
simply do not apply to armed conflicts in which both parties have
plausible political, social and economic claims. The definitional gap
is unfortunate.
In an Alice-in-Wonderland world, however, partisans may stretch
the Article 1 definitions to cover any conflicts in which disputants
protest ethnic or racial discrimination. Thus, Captain Graham won-
ders whether the Indians' take-over at Wounded Knee might fall
within the ambit of Article 1.10 More than one black militant has
demanded prisoner of war treatment,2' and the language of Article 1
may support such claims. Although application of the law of war to
11 Rosenstock, The Delcaration of Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations: a Survey, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 713, 735 (1971). But see Graham,
supra note 1, at 40, who concedes the resolution is "reflective of recognized interna-
tional law concepts."
" Internal conflict in the advanced industrial countries is well within the realm
of possibility, for example.
20 Graham, supra note 1, at 51.
21 Others outside these United States take such claims seriously. The Organiza-
tion for African Unity, for example, recognized the Student Non-Violent Coordinating
Committee as a "Liberation Movement" at the 1967 International Seminar on Aparth-
eid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa.
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such situations seems ludicrous, one cannot dismiss that possibility
so long as Article 1 contains no standards of application other than
the disputants' claim to be struggling against colonialist/alien domi-
nated/racist forces.
When treaty language yields results by turns troublesome, unfor-
tunate and ludicrous, the language requires revision. Article 1 needs
revision for another reason as well: it is not integrated effectively into
the existing legal regime. As a result, the coverage of Article 1 is
uncertain even where the conflict is clearly one against a colonial-
ist/alien dominated/racist regime. As Captain Graham points out,
common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, to which Article 1 is
expressly subordinated, covers only "cases of declared war or of any
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the
High Contracting Parties" and "all cases of partial or total occupa-
tion of the territory of a High Contracting Party. '2 2 Since national
liberation movements will not have signed the 1949 Conventions,
they cannot claim the rights ostensibly given them in Article 1. This
result, anomalous as it may appear in light of the draftsmen's appar-
ent intent,2 follows logically from the language of the two Articles
when read together as they must be.
Moreover, all the Geneva Convention provisions should not apply
to wars of national liberation or other kinds of internal conflict. In the
first place, the typical parties to an internal conflict-governor and
guerrilla alike-cannot hope to comply with the many detailed provi-
sions of the Geneva Conventions.24 Given the usual lack of resources
and governmental infrastructure in the third-world countries where
internal conflicts are most likely to occur, the parties could not fulfill
their obligations even it they acted in good faith. It is unwise to
demand the impossible: it reduces the law to hypocrisy and invites
disregard of the entire legal regime, even those parts with which
compliance could be reasonably expected.
The inappropriateness of particular provisions, when applied to
internal conflict, is a second reason for rejecting application of the
Geneva Conventions in toto. Article 4 of the Prisoner of War Conven-
tion illustrates this defect. It specifies the criteria other than mem-
12 Graham, supra note 1, at 46-47. The text of the article may be found in [1955]
3 U.S.T. 3114, 3116.
2 Professor Baxter reports that the proponents of amended Article I felt that the
Geneva Conventions should apply to wars of national liberation. Report of the United
States Delegation 7 (1974).
24 Bond, Protection of Non-Combatants in Guerrilla Wars, 12 WM. & MARY L.
Rav. 787, 803-04 (1971).
- [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3316, 3320.
1975]
HeinOnline  -- 32 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 71 1975
72 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXII
bership in the "regular armed forces" for prisoner of war status:
Members . . .of organized resistance movements, [who] ful-
fill the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible
for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable
at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operation in accordance
with the laws and customs of war.
Since guerrilla tactics are widely employed by all parties to an inter-
nal conflict, many participants will not qualify as prisoners of war
under the Article 4 criteria. "Swabbing on" the Geneva Conventions
does not suffice as a solution to the problems of internal conflict.
For all its sins of craftsmanship, Article 1 is not beyond salvation,
as I shall shortly demonstrate. More importantly, Article 1 is worth
saving. In its awkward way it does specify one useful criterion for
determining when participants in an internal conflict should observe
at least some of the restraints imposed by the law of war: the purpose,
goal or objective of the participants. The criterion is useful because
it is often an indicium of a particularly bloody and protracted con-
flict-precisely the kind of conflict to which the laws of war should
apply. Partisans who believe that they are fighting for their freedom
against racist and colonial overlords will not meekly flee the field of
battle. Such claims also touch the sympathies of many outside the
country and often induce their covert assistance, which intensifies the
conflict. It is therefore scarcely unrealistic to assert, as did the Gen-
eral Assembly in its Resolution entitled Basic Principles of the Legal
Status of the Combatants Struggling Against Colonial and Alien
Domination and Racist Regimes, that "any attempt to suppress the
struggle against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes
. . .constitutes a threat to internal peace and security."28 Thus, in
societies where the bells toll for racial or ethnic groups, many others
outside that society will know that the bells toll for them as well.
Article 1 also represents another evolutionary step in the "inter-
nalization" of the rules governing all armed conflict. While Captain
Graham correctly asserts that traditional international law did not
apply to internal conflicts, he ignores the modern trend toward appli-
28 G. A. Res. 3103 (XXVII) (Dec. 12, 1973).
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cation of at least some parts of the law of war to an ever-increasing
range of internal armed conflicts. I have documented this trend else-
where;2 here I will only point out that Protocol ]E,28 over whose appar-
ent demise Captain Graham weeps crocodile tears, would have ex-
tended and expanded common Article 3, which applies to all armed
conflict of a non-international nature. Contrary to Captain Graham's
protests, there is then nothing revolutionary in the rationale that
underlies Article 1. Its extension of the law of war to particular kinds
of internal conflicts is but a logical extension of pre-existing legal
norms. Its principal defect is not that it goes too far, but that it does
not go far enough.
Yet useful as is the purpose criterion, it is not an infallible guide
to the kinds of internal conflicts to which the laws of war ought to
apply. Loss of property and life and violation of basic human
rights-the infliction of the often unnecessary suffering that the law
of war seeks to mitigate-are not confined to wars of national libera-
tion.21 We must then identify those other criteria that, when consid-
ered with the goals of the participants, characterize internal conflicts
whose destructiveness can be mitigated by application of the law of
war.
The duration of the conflict, the use of regular combat troops, and
the invocation of emergency governmental powers all measure the
intensity of the conflict.2 0 As with the purpose criterion, none of these
J. BOND, THE RuLEs OF RIOT, INTERNAL CONFLICr AND THE LAW OF WAR 7-44
(1974).
n Draft Protocol II would establish a mini-convention for internal conflict, which
is presently governed only by common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The text
of the protocol may be obtained from the International Committee of the Red Cross.
While I agree that adoption of Draft Protocol II is preferable to application of all the
conventions through amendment of Draft Protocol I, I do not believe that the latter
course is irresponsible. In light of the United States' historic opposition to broadening
greatly the range of conflicts subject to the law of war, one may doubt any implied
enthusiasm for draft Protocol II, were its scope of application enlarged as in amended
Article I.
" E.g., during the recent Nigerian civil war, as many as 2,000,000 Biafrans may
have died. N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1970, § 1, at 22, col. 3. A reporter in Ceylon, covering
the 1971 revolt there, filed this report with the Associated Press:
Bodies of young men presumably killed by policemen and soldiers
have been floating down rivers in groups toward the sea near Colombia
. . . . Some of them were decapitated and others riddled with bullets,
their wrists bound behind their backs.
N.Y. Times, April 25, 1971, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
31 INSTrTUTE OF WORLD POLITY, THE LAW OF LMITED INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 48-49
(1965).
1975]
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is by itself an adequate indicator. For example, governments often
call upon regular army units to quell riots; but since riots usually
dissipate within a few hours or days, the law of war would not gener-
ally apply. Similarly, governments often resort to emergency powers
in order to deal effectively with a wide range of problems other than
armed resistance of their authority.3' Where a government does in-
voke emergency powers to deal with armed conflict, their invocation
indicates that the government takes the armed resistance seriously.
Moreover, their invocation will necessarily curtail the exercise of
rights whose curtailment is often regulated by the law of war.32 As a
general rule, the longer the conflict the greater the need for applica-
tion of the law of war. Yet even this criterion cannot be relied upon
solely. A group of bandits, cloaking its common criminality in politi-
cal rhetoric, might survive for years without creating a situation to
which the law of war should apply. My point is simple enough: multi-
ple criteria must be used to identify those internal conflicts that
should be regulated by the law of war.
Remedying the drafting defects outlined above will necessitate
radical surgery on the present language of Article 1. Rather than
making all the Geneva Conventions applicable to internal conflicts,
the Article should make only the general principles common to those
conventions applicable; and those principles should be enumerated.3
A less desirable remedy for the problem of total application would be
specification of the Geneva articles that either do or do not apply.
Picking and choosing from among the several hundred Geneva arti-
cles would prove burdensome and would probably yield unsatisfac-
tory results, however.
Paragraph 2 should be expanded to include criteria other than the
objective of the parties. As presently drafted, the range of internal
conflicts to which the law of war would apply is too narrow and too
uncertain. The addition of several other criteria-the use of regular
government troops, the invocation of emergency powers, and the
length of the conflict-would clarify and enlarge the cases of applica-
tion.
3' The government of Bangledesh has, for example, just recently imposed martial
law in order to deal with the deteriorating economic conditions in that country.
32 E.g., Article 49 of the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons
regulates relocation of the civilian population during war.
1 Present Article 3 follows this approach. IV J. PicTET, COMMENTARY, GENEVA
CONVENTIONS 30-34 (1958). Its chief weakness is its failure to enumerate the applicable
principles in adequate detail.
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Effect of Article 1
Throughout his article, Captain Graham bemoans the conse-
quences that will attend adoption of Article 1. Specifically, he wor-
ries that "the effect that the adoption of amended Article 1 will have
on the established concepts of conflict management is substantial."
He elaborates:
. . . Reference to struggles for self-determination in the
context of an article conferring a preferred status on particular
armed conflicts tends to elevate the principle of self-
determination to the position of a legal right, justifying the use
of armed force by the now-favored liberation movements and
perhaps even by third states, despite the fact that neither self-
defense nor Security Council action is involved. Thus, where
claims of self-determination are espoused, war once again be-
comes a legally recognized instrument for challenging and
changing rights based on existing international law.
As a result, attempts to use the United Nations Charter to
prevent unilateral recourse to war may be corrupted to the
point that the Charter serves not as a prohibition against, but
as a justification for again using armed force as an instrument
for carrying out national policy. The adoption of amended Ar-
ticle 1 by a majority of the world's states would clearly demon-
strate a desire to refute the basic prohibitions against the use
of force contained in the Charter. .... 34
Since the wisdom or unwisdom of a treaty provision ought to be
judged by the results that will likely follow from its adoption, Captain
Graham's assertions on this point-if true-call into question the
wisdom of Article 1.
We may put to one side the question whether general interna-
tional law presently does or in the future ought to sanction wars
against colonialist/alien dominated/racist regimes. 5 Teaching at a
school named after two traitors, I take a perhaps more sanguine view
of such movements than does a career Army officer whose employers
acted for more than a decade as if they had a roving commission to
3, Graham, supra note 1, at 44.
The degree to which states remain free to use force is much debated. It seems
fair to say, I think, that the prohibition on use of force is not so absolute as Captain
Graham suggests. Certainly the legal advisor to the United States Secretary of State
has always been able to throw some kind of cloak about this country's use of force
(though on occasion the cynical have "admired" the emperor's clothes).
1975]
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suppress revolution everywhere in the world. To repeat, Captain Gra-
ham's argument, is not, however, that general international law sanc-
tions such wars; rather, he argues that this specific treaty provision
legitimates such wars. I do not agree.
Although I may be like the apocrophal French scholar who read
and reread the American Constitution for a month without finding
the provision that gave our Supreme Court the power of judicial
review, I have pored over the language of Article I and have found
no clause that legitimates resort to arms. It may be there-by impli-
cation from the travaux pr6paratoires, for example3 6-but it is not in
the express language of the Article. What is there is a reference to the
right as determined by other extrinsic documents, those being the
Charter and the Declaration on Principles of International Law con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States. In other
words, the Article does not itself legitimate any right to take up arms;
instead, it recognizes whatever right exists under general interna-
tional law.
Captain Graham's concern that the article may lead to discrimi-
natory treatment of combatants is less easily refuted, though he him-
self does concede that the language of Article 1 speaks in neutral
terms: "Proponents of Article 1 would no doubt be quick to point out
that the provisions of Protocol I would also control the conduct of
national liberation groups .... " His concern is pragmatic rather
than theoretical, however: "... due to the very nature of these con-
flicts, there is reason to question both the ability and willingness of
such groups to adhere to the Protocol's provisions."37
Captain Graham is at least half right. Few guerrilla groups will
be able to carry out all their obligations under the Geneva conven-
tions should the whole of the law of war bind them, as it presumably
would under amended Article 1. Guerrilla fighters can neither stuff
judicial robes into their hip pockets nor transform a mountain cave
into a courtroom. The very fact that they are guerrillas rather than
goveriors precludes their acting like the latter; and to the degree that
the law of war imposes obligations on governors qua governors, the
guerrillas will perforce be unable to comply.
Much of the law of war, though formulated with governors rather
11 Professor Baxter reports that proponents of amended Article 1 argued that
"peoples under colonial rule or otherwise denied their right to self-determination are
entitled to independence [and] that it is proper for them to assert this right through
the use of force. . . ." Report of the United States Delegation 7 (1974).
" Graham, supra note 1, at 45.
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than guerrillas in mind as both applier and addressee, nevertheless
speaks neutrally. It imposes obligations that all participants can dis-
charge. Guerrilla and governor alike can respect the rights of the sick
and wounded. Neither need inflict unnecessary suffering. The control
and operation of governmental institutions does not enhance the gov-
ernor's capacity to comply with these rules. Conversely, the fact that
the guerrilla has no government to run does not preclude his compli-
ance.
That both have the capacity to comply does not, of course, mean
that either will. Neither governor nor guerrilla has an enviable repu-
tation for fidelity to the law of war .3 Both have violated its most
basic restraints with discouraging frequency. Captain Graham is thus
disingenuous when he frets ". . . amended Article 1 would in reality
severely limit the defensive efforts of a government, while offering
assistance to those individuals engaged in a struggle against it."' , The
record of state practice reduces to the ludicrous any suggestion, such
as is implied in the foregoing statement, that governors will ham-
string themselves observing the law of war while their unrestrained
guerrilla tormentors torture them." It ain't gonna' happen that way,
and Captain Graham knows it.
What will happen, then, if amended Article 1 is adopted? While
adoption will transform neither the guerrilla nor the governor into
law-abiding warriors, it will subject both to pressures to conform their
conduct to the applicable legal norms. The utility of the laws of war
inheres precisely in their usefulness as a prism for focusing and rein-
forcing pressure on participants to modify particularly objectionable
conduct. By enlarging the scope of conflicts subject to the law of war,
Article 1 forces participants to act in a less parochial context: they
must act out their drama of horror on the stage of the world." They
must take international opinion into account and moderate their con-
duct accordingly. Guerrillas, who assiduously cultivate international
Alone among participants in internal conflicts did Algerians recognize that
Article 3 governed their conduct. See generally J. Siois, LE DRorr Da LA GuERRE Er
LEs CONFLIcTs ARMIES D'UN CHwARcTERE NON-INTERNATIONAL (1958).
2' Graham, supra note 1, at 45.
" What is more likely is that the governors will emulate their guerrilla tormentors.
See, e.g., R. TRINQUIER, MODERN WARFARE 8 (1961); "Ulster, Ill-Treatment Not Tor-
ture," The Washington Post, Nov. 17, 1971, at 21, col. 1. The much discussed Phoenix
program was a response to Viet Cong Assassinations. See Kelly, Assassination in War
Time, 30 Mm. L. Rav. 101, 109 (1965).
"1 One is reminded of Queen Mary's warning to Queen Elizabeth: the theater of
the world is wider than the stage of England.
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opinion, are presumably as subject to such pressures as are gover-
nors.
42
Because the world will not likely be enraged by a failure to post
copies of the Geneva Conventions on a tree in a prison stockade or a
refusal to permit prisoner receipt of a box of Granny's homemade
fudge, governor and guerrilla alike may safely ignore such Geneva
rules. They may not ignore with equal impunity the Geneva rules
that prohibit unnecessary destruction and suffering. Torture, starva-
tion, terrorization, or indiscriminate "wasting" may well enrage the
world. Guerrilla and governor alike must thus decide whether any
possible benefit derived from such tactics justifies the cost in lost
good will, respect and, perhaps, external support. Since the Geneva
rules which prohibit unnecessary destruction and suffering reflect a
pragmatic military judgment that such tactics are counterpro-
ductive, both the rational guerrilla and governor ought to decide to
observe these Geneva restraints. Unfortunately, rationality is usually
the first casualty of war.
I do not naively assume that the world will cry out in a single voice
of outrage. Neither do I expect that a righteous world will direct its
wrath judiciously at all who violate the laws of war. We cannot escape
our human natures simply because we are submerged in a collective
called mankind: we all tolerate the excesses of our friends more read-
ily than we do those of our enemies. Still, we may temper our natural
impulses in times of crisis by defining the limits of immoral conduct
in less heated moments. A code will at least define the scope of any
ensuing debate over the permissibility of particular conduct.
More importantly, Article 1 will focus debate on the permissibility
of the conduct rather than on the anterior question of application.
Guerrillas and governors have almost never claimed that they had the
right to violate the Geneva rules; instead, they have argued that the
Geneva rules did not apply to them.43 By expanding and clarifying
the scope of coverage, Article 1 will preclude claims of non-
application. For the first time participants will have to justify their
often outrageous conduct in terms of the Geneva principles. Article
1 may thus serve the cause of humanitarianism tolerably well in an
inhumane world.
42 The recently reported decision by the P.L.O. to moderate its terror campaigns
has historical parallels. There is evidence that Alexander the Great moderated the
ferocity of his campaigns in Asia Minor because the people there thought his conduct
barbarian. See H. GROTIUS, RiOHTs OF WAR AND PEACE 372-74 (A. Campbell trans.
1901).
13 E.g., The Viet Cong rejected the idea that it was bound "by the international
treaties to which others besides itself subscribed." 5 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROss 636
(1965).
HeinOnline  -- 32 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 78 1975
